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The Implicit Legitimisation of Violence against Women in New Zealand 
Homicide Cases: Did Abolishing Provocation Address Public Concerns? 
The partial defence of provocation was inappropriately used by abusive men that 
killed their partners for challenging them. This led to concerns that provocation 
was implicitly legitimising violent reactions toward women who were perceived to 
have challenged their male partner’s sexuality. Despite the abolition of 
provocation, this paper finds a continuation of the concerns that arose from the 
use of provocation in post-abolition homicide sentencing decisions. Specifically, 
the recognition of perceived lower culpability of men that had killed their female 
partners in the form of manslaughter verdicts, or through inappropriate 
mitigating features, continues to be an issue. For this reason, I argue that 
establishing the Sentencing Council, as recommended by the Law Commission, is 
the best way to address these concerns.  
Key words: provocation, abolition, sentencing, homicide, abnormal jealousy, 
narcissism 
 
I  Introduction  
In 2008 Clayton Weatherston killed his ex-partner Sophie Elliot by 
brutally stabbing her 216 times and then mutilating her corpse.1 Weatherston 
claimed that Elliot had lunged at him with scissors and, against the history of their 
tumultuous relationship, he snapped.2 At trial, Weatherston argued—using the 
partial defence of provocation—that he should be convicted of manslaughter 
rather than murder because Elliot had provoked him. Thankfully, the jury did not 
accept that Weatherston had been provoked by Elliot and he was convicted of 
murder.3 The case did, however, result in mass public concern about 
                                                 
1 R v Weatherston CRI 2008-021-137, 15 September 2009 at [9]. 
2 At [10]. 
3 At [10]. 
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Weatherston’s ability to raise the partial defence of provocation at trial.4 In 
particular, provocation was seen to allow Weatherston to unfairly denigrate Elliot, 
enabling him to present degrading evidence to move the focus of the trial onto the 
victim rather than the offender.5 Through the use of provocation Elliot became the 
villain in the story of her own murder—the argument essentially being that she 
was to blame for her own death because she challenged her male ex-partner. 
Provocation as a partial defence functioned by allowing the defence to 
simply raise evidence indicating that the victim’s actions were sufficiently 
provocative that they would deny a person of ordinary self-control of that self-
control.6 It must be this provocative action that caused the offender to kill the 
victim.7 The jury then had to consider whether the prosecution had disproved the 
availability of provocation as a partial defence beyond reasonable doubt. If the 
prosecution was unable to do this, the partial defence would reduce the murder 
charge to one of manslaughter, reflecting the lower culpability of the offender.8  
On two separate occasions, the Law Commission argued that provocation 
was irreparably broken and should be abolished.9 The disproportionate use of the 
defence to protect heterosexual men was noted by the Law Commission in 2007;10 
a concern that echoed criticisms made by academics in the early 1990s.11 
Academics had been troubled by how provocation seemed to frame female 
victims killed by their male partners as authors of their own tragedy.12 
Provocation was used more often in defence of men who killed their female 
                                                 
4 Edward Gay “Partial defence of provocation set to be dumped” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, Auckland, 23 July 2009). 
5 Gay, above n 4.  
6 Crimes Act 1961, s 169(2)(a). 
7 Crimes Act, s 169(2)(b). 
8 Crimes Act, s 169(1). 
9 New Zealand Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, Wellington, 
2007) at [183]; New Zealand Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular 
Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, Wellington, 2001) at [120]. 
10 The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [96]. 
11 Elisabeth McDonald “Provocation, Sexuality and the Actions of ‘Thoroughly Decent men’” 
(1993) 9(2) Women's Studies Journal 126. 
12 At 130.  
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partners, than it was used to defend battered women who killed their abusive male 
partners.13  
The outcry following the Weatherston case re-emphasised many of the 
criticisms made by the Law Commission and other academics. Parliament took 
notice of these concerns and began moving to abolish provocation.14 In 2009 
provocation was abolished by the Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Act. It was hoped 
that abolishing provocation would fix many of the concerns surrounding the 
defence and its problematic use by male offenders against their female partners. 
I argue that simply abolishing provocation as a partial defence has not had 
the intended effect of quelling some the problematic gender bias in homicide 
cases. I demonstrate that inappropriate mitigating features—such as narcissism or 
abnormal jealousy—are still being used and imply that the victim was in part 
responsible for triggering their jealous partner into killing them. Furthermore, I 
show that in several cases, following the abolition of provocation, arguably 
inappropriate manslaughter verdicts have resulted when juries have attempted to 
partially protect sympathetic male offenders whose sexuality has been challenged 
by their less sympathetic female partner. 
To begin this discussion, in Part II of this paper I consider some of the 
numerous criticisms of the partial defence of provocation, focusing particular 
attention on those raised by the Law Commission in their 2007 Report The Partial 
Defence of Provocation (“the Provocation Report”).  I use these criticisms to 
illustrate why provocation was eventually abolished. In Part III I narrow my focus 
to criticisms of provocation concerning female victims killed by their abusive 
male partners. Using these criticisms, I highlight how the bias favouring 
heterosexual men in homicide cases was reinforced by provocation.  
In Part IV I review potential solutions suggested by the Law Commission 
and the Family Violence Death Review Committee (“FVDRC”) to address the 
                                                 
13 The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [121]. 
14 “Key Approves Scrapping Provocation” Otago Daily Times (online ed, Dunedin, 23 July 
2009). 
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inevitable gap left by the abolition of provocation. In particular, I focus on the 
Law Commission’s recommendation that a Sentencing Council be established to 
help guide sentencing judges and ensure a consistent approach to sentencing.15  
Provocation did not completely disappear from the law when it was 
abolished, as it was recognised that in appropriate cases provocation might still be 
a relevant consideration at sentencing. In Part V I explore the shift of provocation 
from an issue considered by a jury at trial, to one considered at sentencing by a 
judge. I discuss how provocation is relevant at the sentencing stage of a murder 
case as a mitigating factor, and/or as a factor relevant to rebuttal of the 
presumption of life imprisonment.  
I argue in Part VI of this paper that the troubling pattern of legitimised 
violence toward women killed by their male partners remains a problem at 
sentencing, despite the abolition of provocation. To expose this pattern I compare 
six representative homicide sentencing cases; two of which occurred before and 
four of which occurred after the abolition of provocation. Specifically, these cases 
all involved situations where a man killed their female partner or ex-partner after 
she had challenged him by either leaving him or insinuating she had been 
unfaithful. Using this analysis, I show that there has been no substantive change in 
the sentencing of these cases, despite the abolition of provocation. These results 
support that simply abolishing provocation as a partial defence only partly 
alleviated the problems in cases where female victims had been killed by their 
male ex-partner or partner.  
Based on the lack of change revealed through my case comparisons, in 
Part VII I conclude that adopting the Law Commission’s recommendation to 
introduce a Sentencing Council could play a vital role in helping to address some 
of the concerns raised in Part VI. In deciding not to establish the Sentencing 
Council, Parliament has failed to recognise and take action against the public 
concerns emphasised in Weatherston. Through this lack of action the problematic 
gender bias seen in homicide sentencing remains, allowing the legitimisation of 
                                                 
15  The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [205]. 
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violence toward women when they are perceived to have challenged their male 
partner or ex-partner.  
II  The Partial Defence of Provocation and the Rationale for its 
Abolition  
In New Zealand provocation had been codified since 1893.16 However, 
most recently it was contained in s 169 of the Crimes Act 1961. Prior to its 
abolition, s 169 allowed the reduction of a charge from one of murder to 
manslaughter where the actions of the victim were deemed to be sufficiently 
provocative that they would deny a person of ordinary self-control of that self-
control, all other circumstances remaining the same, and that it was this 
provocative action that caused them to kill the victim. For provocation to be 
introduced to the jury in a trial the judge had to decide as a matter of law whether 
there was sufficient evidence for provocation to be considered. The jury then 
considered whether the prosecution had disproved the availability of provocation 
as a partial defence beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution was unable to do 
this, the partial defence prevailed and manslaughter would result as the verdict. 
In New Zealand provocation was a defence that primarily favoured 
heterosexual men.17 Provocation was very rarely relied on by woman—in part 
because woman commit fewer homicides—meaning that as a defence it 
disproportionately benefitted men.18 In addition, provocation was pled in 
circumstances in which a man perceived that their sexuality had been 
challenged.19 The Law Commission had reflected concerns about the continued 
existence of provocation as a partial defence as well, reviewing provocation twice 
since the year 2000, and in both cases calling for its abolition.20 In the 
                                                 
16 Criminal Code Act 1893, s 65. 
17   The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [121]. 
18   McDonald, above n 11, at 127. 
19   At 128. 
20  The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [183]; Some Criminal Defences with 
Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, above n 9, at [120]. 
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Provocation Report, the Law Commission gave four key reasons that helped 
establish why provocation was irreparably flawed.21 
The first criticism was that provocation distinguished between an 
offender’s self-control (which was assessed objectively), and an offender’s 
perception of the gravity of the provocation (which was assessed subjectively).22 
This objective/subjective test allowed for characteristics that affected the 
perceived severity of a provocative action to be considered, but not characteristics 
that could alter a person’s self-control. Provocation as a defence was meant to 
recognise human frailty as a factor that lowered a person’s culpability.23 
Therefore it seemed illogical that an offender was unable to raise uncontrollable 
characteristics that lowered their capacity for self-control. Problematically, 
however, recognising characteristics that modulated self-control would cause 
provocation to lose the normative objective self-control aspect of the defence that 
Parliament was attempting to achieve in s 169.24 In other words, no real solution 
could be forged to fix the objective/subjective split.  
Secondly, the foundational assumption made by the partial defence that it 
was, in fact, possible to lose self-control was questioned.25 As a phenomenon 
there is still debate surrounding what factors influence self-control and whether 
self-control truly exists. For example, it is currently unclear whether self-control 
is simply a biophysical response (an automatic/uncontrollable response) or is in 
fact moderated by reason (a more controlled/rational response).26 This introduces 
more complicating factors around how fair or logical it is to consider self-control 
objectively as it is impossible for the law to determine whether the offender had 
any control over their response. 
                                                 
21  At [78]. 
22  At [83]. 
23  Kate Fitz-Gibbon Homicide Law Reform, Gender and the Provocation Defence a Comparative 
Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, England, 2014) at 8. 
24  The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [86]. 
25  At [88]. 
26   At [88]. 
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Thirdly, it was noted that killing a person in response to a provocative 
action was the response of an extraordinary, rather than ordinary person.27 
Comparing a killer’s level of self-control against that of an ordinary person does 
not make sense, because an ordinary person would not lose their self-control to 
such an extent that they killed another person. Furthermore, a violent or homicidal 
reaction to a perceived provocation is not a reaction that either Parliament or 
society should want to recognise as less culpable. 
Finally, the Provocation Report recognised that the partial defence was 
biased in favour of heterosexual men.28 When provocation was pleaded by a man 
that killed a woman, often there was a romantic or sexual relationship between the 
victim and the offender, and some challenge had been raised to the offender’s 
sexuality.29 Furthermore provocation had been successfully pled in several cases 
where homosexual men had been killed by heterosexual men for making a non-
violent sexual advance.30 In addition, even if the defence was not accepted by the 
jury, the introduction of provocation still supported the notion that violence was 
an appropriate response in cases where a man’s sexuality had been challenged by 
their partner.31  
Provocation as a partial defence primarily focused on the frailty of 
humanity, and the recognition that in some circumstances the provocative actions 
of the victim were sufficiently serious to lower the culpability of the offender.32 
The primary justification for allowing a reduced charge in these circumstances 
was that historically murder had been punishable by death or, more recently, life 
imprisonment, and such punishments would be too harsh in these cases.33  
The Sentencing Act 2002 put this fear to rest, because it changed what had 
historically been a mandatory life sentence for murder to a presumption of life 
                                                 
27    At [89]. 
28   At [96]. 
29    McDonald, above n 11, at 127. 
30   The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [97]. 
31    McDonald, above n 11, at 128. 
32   Fitz-Gibbon, above n 23, at 8. 
33   At 8.  
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imprisonment. Section 102 provides that if it can be shown that a life sentence 
would be considered “manifestly unjust” in the circumstances, then the 
presumption is rebutted and a lower sentence may be applied.34 Section 102 
therefore made it possible for the recognition of lower culpability in cases where 
the provocative actions of the victim might be relevant. This wider discretion 
reduced the need for the provocation defence, as the inability to apply a sentence 
lower than life was no longer a concern.  
Provocation rose in public infamy for its treatment of female victims 
during 2009 when Clayton Weatherston was being tried for the murder of Sophie 
Elliot.35 This was not the first time concerns had arisen about how provocation 
legitimised violence by men against their female partners. In the Part III below I 
further discuss the issues faced in cases where a male offender killed their female 
partner or ex-partner after their sexuality had been challenged.  
III Problems Arising from the Use of Provocation in Cases 
Involving Challenges to Male Sexuality  
Provocation in part began as a defence of the scorned husband.36 Men 
would claim that their wives or ex-wives had somehow provoked their own 
murder through actions that were perceived to be threatening.37 In fact, this threat 
was often not a physical one, but rather a challenge to male sexuality through 
perceived or real infidelity, threats to leave, or insults.38 
When provocation was left to juries in cases of sexual jealousy, it reduced 
women to possessory objects by normalising violent reactions to non-violent 
romantic or sexual contexts that were perceived as threatening by the man in 
question.39 In the context of domestic homicides, provocation ultimately defended 
a man’s ‘right’ to his female partner’s body—either by denying her the right to 
                                                 
34  Sentencing Act 2002, s 102. 
35   Gay, above n 4. 
36    McDonald, above n 11, at 128. 
37   At 128. 
38   At 128. 
39   At 135. 
11 The Implicit Legitimisation of Violence against Women in New Zealand Homicide Cases 
 
 
leave the relationship, or to sleep with others if she chose. Provocation essentially 
legitimised a violent reaction when the victim was seen to be less worthy of 
respect. This was sometimes reflected in the language used by judges when 
discussing possible infidelity. Emphasis was often placed on whether there was a 
legitimate claim of unfaithfulness—the implication being that victims who had 
been unfaithful were more ‘deserving’ of the violence inflicted upon them.40 
Indeed, because provocation compared the offender’s self-control against that of 
the ordinary person it implicitly prescribed appropriate ‘non-triggering’ behaviour 
for women to adhere to if they wished to ensure their safety from their male 
partners.41 
As a partial defence, provocation was only available when the offender 
was accused of murder. This was problematic because normally the only 
witnesses to the events leading up to the victim’s death were the victim 
themselves and the offender. Because the offender was required to present 
evidence of the provocative actions of the victim, the lack of corroborating 
witnesses allowed the offender to tell his side of the story without contradiction.42 
This could mean that ultimately a possibly untrue, and negative image of the 
victim could remain described in the case—sometimes even transferring through 
into sentencing and the public record.43  
Provocation also tended to move the focus of the trial from the guilt of the 
offender to the behaviour of the victim. This could lead to evidence of possible 
sexual betrayal by the victim being emphasised, while evidence of the victim 
attempting to leave the offender was lost.44 This was problematic because it 
painted the victim as a villain, while taking the spotlight off the offender’s 
controlling and violent behaviour.45  
                                                 
40 At 131. 
41 Jenny Morgan, “Critique and Comment: Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No 
Tales, Tales Are Told About Them” (1997) 21 MULR 237 at 274.  
42 At 242. 
43 At 247. 
44  At 248. 
45   At 248. 
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I argue that although the partial defence of provocation has been 
abolished, juries and Judges are still attempting to recognise the perceived lower 
culpability of offenders in cases where either a less ‘deserving’ victim was killed, 
or where the male offender was particularly sympathetic. This shows a continuing 
underlying bias protecting or favouring male sexuality in homicide cases, beyond 
provocation as a partial defence. I argue that provocation was simply a symptom 
of a larger problem surrounding the perception of the place of a woman in a 
relationship with a man, and how the law systemically reduces women in these 
cases to possessory objects. 
When provocation was abolished, it was hoped that many of these issues 
would disappear with the defence. Provocation, however, was to remain in the law 
as a consideration at sentencing. In Part IV I discuss the recommendation that the 
Law Commission made to help ensure that provocation transitioned smoothly 
from a partial defence to a sentencing consideration.  
IV  Potential Solutions to Address the Gap Left by the Abolition of 
Provocation 
The Provocation Report raised concerns about the possibility that 
offenders who would previously have succeeded in pleading the defence of 
provocation would face harsher sentences following the repeal of s 169.46 To 
ensure fairness and consistency in the sentence length of murder cases that 
involved an element of provocation, the Law Commission recommended that the 
Sentencing Council and corresponding Sentencing Guidelines should be created.47 
The Sentencing Council was meant to be an independent statutory body 
established by the Sentencing Council Act 2007. Its function would have been to 
help develop sentencing policy. The Council would have comprised ten members: 
                                                 
46   The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [195]. 
47    At [205]. 
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four judges, the head of the parole board, and five non-judicial members with 
other relevant expertise.48 
One of the main functions of the Council would have been to help draft 
sentencing guidelines. The Law Commission stated in their 2006 Sentence 
Guidelines and Parole Reform Report that sentencing guidelines were meant to be 
able to help guide judges in both the kind and the length of the sentence to be 
imposed.49 Courts would have to follow any relevant guidelines, unless doing so 
would not be in the interests of justice.50 This would ensure consistency between 
most sentencing cases, while still allowing for a degree of flexibility in 
exceptional cases.  
Each sentencing guideline would have been made up of a combination of 
both numerical and narrative sections. The numerical elements of the guidelines 
were to be prescriptive sections that were detailed and presented possible 
penalties depending on the nature of the offence or action.51 The narrative 
elements of the guidelines would focus less on the punishment, and give more 
detail on the purpose or rationale behind penalties or offences. This would have 
allowed for balance between a consistent and flexible approach.52  
The Law Commission in the Provocation Report states that one way to 
ensure that provocation would still be considered a mitigating feature in 
appropriate cases would be to draft a sentencing guideline.53 The guidelines were 
meant to be more detailed than legislation, therefore allowing for an appropriate 
way to determine and provide guidance on circumstances where the presumption 
in favour of life imprisonment should be rebutted, or where provocation should be 
considered a mitigating feature.54 
                                                 
48  New Zealand Law Commission Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform, (NZLC R94, 
Wellington, 2006) at [84]. 
49   At [75]. 
50    At [116]. 
51   At [95]. 
52   At [95]. 
53    The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 9, at [208]. 
54   At [206]. 
14 The Implicit Legitimisation of Violence against Women in New Zealand Homicide Cases 
 
 
This was in part a response to the concern that provocation could cut both 
ways when battered women were involved. When a battered woman was the 
killer, provocation could be helpful in showing lower culpability, but when a 
battered woman was the victim, provocation being pled by their abuser could 
implicitly devalue their loss of life.55 Pre-abolition provocation simply classified 
any successful cases as less culpable by reducing the charge to one of 
manslaughter. A sentencing guideline would be more nuanced, allowing for 
shades of culpability to be recognised along with descriptions of issues that might 
arise in more complex cases. Therefore, a sentencing guideline would hopefully 
help to ensure that victims of domestic violence were not further victimised by an 
arguably biased sentencing system.  
The creation of sentencing guidelines would be done in consultation with 
the public.56 This would have allowed for both public discussion and education on 
what should be included in each sentencing guideline. In relation to provocation 
this would have meant that the public would be involved in guiding what forms of 
conduct could reduce the culpability of the offender. This would hopefully mean 
that in cases where the deceased was a victim of family violence, the public would 
reject the relevance of both the conduct of the victim and characteristics like 
narcissism or jealousy as mitigating features. 
Implementing sentencing guidelines in the way suggested by the Law 
Commission was hoped to provide greater protection for victims of family 
violence as both defendants and victims of homicide. However, commentators 
have argued in response that simply allowing greater discretion in the length of 
sentences in murder cases is not sufficient to recognise the lower culpability of 
defendants that kill their abuser.57 This is because the stigma attached to murder 
remains when a partial defence like provocation is not available to reduce the 
charge to manslaughter.58 As well as this, considering provocation at sentencing 
                                                 
55   At [207]. 
56    At [207]. 
57  Julia Tolmie “Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence? Recent Proposals to Abolish 
Provocation” (2005) NZ Law Review 25 at 27. 
58   At 29. 
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rather than trial takes the decision away from the jury making it seem like a more 
secretive and private process; it is harder to appeal and more difficult to identify 
injustices.59 
Supporting these arguments the Family Violence Death Review 
Committee (FVDRC) issued their Fourth Annual Report in 2014 that raised 
concerns about the possible lengthy sentences that victims of family violence 
would face after they killed their primary abuser.60 The 2014 Report argued that 
because self-defence is narrowly applied in New Zealand many of these 
defendants would be unable to rely on the defence.61 In addition, the abolition of 
provocation left victims of family violence unable to reduce a murder charge to 
one of manslaughter.62 Finally, even if the defendant is able to rebut the 
presumption of life in prison, they are still likely to face a prison sentence longer 
than if they had been convicted of manslaughter.63 
The FVDRC made three main recommendations about how the law should 
be changed to support victims of domestic violence that kill their primary abuser. 
The first was that s 48 of the Crimes Act should be modified so that the test for 
self-defence is accessible to defendants that are victims of domestic violence that 
kill their primary abuser. The second was that a new partial defence akin to 
provocation that is only available to victims of family violence, rather than the 
abuser be created. Finally the FVDRC suggested that the Government should 
form an advisory group of relevant experts to help guide their discussions on how 
to remedy the gap left by the abolition of provocation.64 
Following the publication of the FVDRC’s recommendations the Law 
Commission are reconsidering if the law appropriately protects victims of family 
                                                 
59    At 36. 
60   Family Violence Death Review Committee Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 to December 
2013 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, June 2014) at 102. 
61    At 103. 
62    At 121. 
63    At 121. 
64  At 104. 
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violence that kill their abusive partners now that provocation has been repealed.65 
The Law Commission is specifically looking at whether the test for self-defence 
should be modified, whether a new partial defence is necessary, and whether 
current sentencing practices sufficiently protect victims of domestic violence that 
kill their abusers.  
V Provocation as a Sentencing Consideration in Murder and 
Manslaughter Cases 
Following the abolition of provocation the Law Commission’s 
recommendation to establish a Sentencing Council was never fully implemented. 
This left the judiciary to establish how provocation would be treated at the 
sentencing stage of a trial.  
Historically in New Zealand a murder conviction required that the 
offender be sentenced to life in prison, with variation in the length of the 
minimum non-parole period being allowed to recognise the mitigating and 
aggravating features of the crime. However, from 2002 onward s 102 of the 
Sentencing Act allowed for a sentence less than life imprisonment if life in prison 
would be considered “manifestly unjust”. The Court of Appeal in R v Rapira 
accepted that the “manifestly unjust” standard would only be met in exceptional 
cases and that it was a high threshold.66  
The Court of Appeal held in Hamidzadeh v R that an offender’s justified 
loss of control could be taken into account when determining whether the offender 
had displaced the presumption in favour of life imprisonment by meeting the 
“manifestly unjust” threshold.67 This was because the Court recognised that the 
general purposes of sentencing were still relevant to murder cases, even though 
there was a more restrictive sentencing regime. In particular, the Court found s 
                                                 
65 New Zealand Law Commission Victims of Family Violence that Commit Homicide 
(forthcoming). 
66  R v Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794 at [121]. 
67  Hamidzadeh v R [2012] NZCA 550 at [59]. 
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8(a) of the Sentencing Act 2002 to be relevant.68 This section states that the 
degree of culpability of the offender impacts the gravity of the offence from a 
sentencing perspective. The Court similarly accepted that a loss of control in 
circumstances where the loss of control was justified could lower the culpability 
of an offender so that it would be manifestly unjust to impose a life sentence.69 
Even if s 102 is not satisfied by the defendant the conduct of the victim 
can still be relevant under s 9(2)(c) as a mitigating feature when determining the 
minimum non-parole period the offender will face.70 More recently s 9(2)(c) has 
been interpreted in Wairau v R as not being the same objective/subjective test 
used under s 169.71 Rather a sudden and justified loss of control might make an 
offender less culpable than an offender who was calculated and controlled in their 
response.72 
Possible factors that would help establish whether a sufficiently 
provocative action has occurred were set out in Hamidzadeh. These would help 
determine whether the “manifestly unjust” threshold of s 102 has been met, or to 
what extent the provocative action lowered the culpability of the offender as a 
mitigating factor under s 9(2)(c). The factors included the nature, duration, and 
gravity of the provocative conduct involved; whether the response was 
proportionate in reference to the nature, duration and gravity of the provocation; 
whether the provocation is/was an operative cause of the offender’s response; and 
whether in all circumstances the provocative conduct was sufficient to reduce the 
offender’s culpability.73 It was noted that mental/intellectual impairment, previous 
physical/sexual abuse, or a fear-based rather than anger-based reaction may also 
impact the offender’s overall level of culpability.74  The Court stated that the 
assessment of provocation at sentencing must be a fact-dependent investigation.75 
                                                 
68  At [53]. 
69  At [56]. 
70 At [54]. 
71  Wairau v R [2015] NZCA 215 at [29]. 
72  Hamidzadeh v R, above n 67, at [60]. 
73  At [62]. 
74  At [63]. 
75  At [62]. 
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These factors were explicitly stated as not being conclusive, as the “manifestly 
unjust” threshold must remain flexible.76 
The Court stated that although a provocative action of the victim could be 
taken into account when considering if it would be manifestly unjust to impose a 
life sentence, it was not an easy standard to reach.77 Rather, it was only in 
exceptional cases that the conduct of the victim justified a sentence less than life. 
In Wairau v R it was stressed that the provocative conduct of the victim does not 
justify a violent result, rather the question was whether it reduced the culpability 
of the offender.78 In addition, a transfer of affection by itself was not sufficient to 
mitigate offending, unless in exceptional circumstances.79 
The high level of provocation required to reach the “manifestly unjust” 
threshold under s 102 of the Crimes Act should ideally stop a sentence lower than 
life resulting in cases where male offender killed their female partner after a 
challenge his sexuality. Unfortunately, mitigating factors such as narcissism and 
jealousy are not directly related to the conduct of the victim and therefore do not 
fall within Hamidzadeh. Furthermore, these factors only apply to sentencing 
judges—juries are still able to recognise the perceived lower culpability of an 
offender through a manslaughter verdict. In part VI I use a pre- and post-abolition 
homicide case comparison to help establish that a problematic gender bias still 
exists within homicide cases, despite the abolition of provocation.  
VI  Case Comparisons Before and After the Abolition of 
Provocation  
A Challenges to Male Sexuality Reducing an Offender’s Culpability in 
Manslaughter Verdicts 
The partial defence of provocation worked by reducing a murder charge to 
one of manslaughter when the prosecution could not negate the contention that the 
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77  At [67]. 
78  Wairau v R, above n 71, at [31]. 
79  At [39]. 
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offender had been provoked.  Historically a challenge to a man’s sexuality—such 
as a threat of separation or the perception of an affair—frequently formed the 
basis for a plea of provocation.80 Through this mechanism, provocation protected 
the ‘right’ of a man to defend his male honour by inflicting legitimised violence 
against the source of his provocation.  
I argue that following the abolition of provocation, juries and sentencing 
judges in manslaughter cases continue to inappropriately protect the construct of 
male sexuality when it is perceived to have been threatened. To support this 
argument I analyse one pre-abolition and two post-abolition manslaughter cases in 
which a female partner has challenged her male partner’s sexuality, either by 
leaving him, or insinuating she has been unfaithful. I will show that manslaughter 
was arguably an inappropriate verdict in all three cases, and that simply 
abolishing provocation has not quelled concerns about the bias toward 
heterosexual men in homicide cases. 
R v Rerekura is an example of a case in which provocation was accepted 
as a partial defence resulting in a manslaughter rather than murder conviction.81 
Rerekura did occur 27 years ago, but is still useful as an example of a successful 
provocation defence. In February 1987 Rerekura retrieved a shotgun from his car 
and killed his partner, Carol Ahipere, after he claimed that she told him she no 
longer loved him and could get a man to have sex with her any time she wanted.82 
Rerekura was charged with and tried for the murder of Ahipere. At trial Rerekura 
raised the partial defence of provocation, claiming that Ahipere’s alleged 
comment about being able to get other men enraged him to the point that a person 
of ordinary self-control would lose that self-control. The jury accepted that 
Rerekura had been provoked and he received only six years imprisonment for 
manslaughter.83 
                                                 
80    McDonald, above n 11, at 127. 
81   R v Rerekura CA361/87, 21 June 1988 at 1. 
82    At 2. 
83    At 3. 
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McMullin J describes how Rerekura loved his now deceased partner very 
much and that he has deprived himself of his partner’s company.84 These 
statements paint Ahipere as belonging to Rerekura; that her loss of life was a 
punishment in of itself to Rerekura even though Ahipere was the one that died. 
This questionably sympathetic tone continues throughout the whole judgement—
the trial judge even calling Rerekura a ‘thoroughly decent man’.85 
Following provocation being abolished as a partial defence in December 
2009 there have been several manslaughter cases in which the female victim had 
performed allegedly provocative conduct just prior to death which resulted in the 
male offender killing them. Because these are jury trials it is impossible to tell 
conclusively why the jury felt that the offender was guilty of manslaughter rather 
than murder. I argue, however, that the verdicts in these cases were in part borne 
out of the jury’s desire to protect the perceived rights of the male offenders in 
their respective relationships, while blaming the female victims for their own 
deaths because they acted against these norms.  
R v Bevan is a good example of a post-abolition case in which the 
manslaughter verdict reached by the jury is questionable.86 In 2011 Bevan and his 
girlfriend, Lake, had had a fight which resulted in Bevan hitting Lake and 
vandalising the inside of their home. Bevan then left the house to collect a firearm 
that was hidden at a family farm. He returned and began playing with the firearm, 
removing the magazine in the process. He then stood next to Lake on the bed, 
who was lying with her eyes closed. Bevan aimed the gun at Lake’s head and told 
her to clean the house. He then pulled the trigger, killing Lake.  
At trial Bevan claimed that he did not know the gun was loaded and that 
he thought it was safe.87 Bevan was convicted of manslaughter rather than 
                                                 
84   At 4. 
85   At 3.  
86   R v Bevan [2012] NZHC 2969. 
87   At [15]. 
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murder, presumably because the jury felt he lacked murderous intent.88 Bevan was 
sentenced to five years and eight months in prison for Lake’s manslaughter.89 
During sentencing Mallon J said that she did not accept that the firearm 
was discharged without anger or aggression and that it was implausible that Bevan 
would point the gun at Lake and ask her to clean the house in a non-threatening 
manner.90 The fact that Bevan was still angry when he pointed the gun at Lake’s 
head supports that he did so in an attempt to control Lake’s behaviour by forcing 
her to clean the house after he had damaged it. This ‘attempt to control’ shows the 
relevant power construct that I argue the jury was attempting to protect through 
their verdict that Bevan was only guilty of manslaughter. Essentially, it is an 
implicit approval of Bevan’s position as the dominating partner in the 
relationship, as well as a recognition of Bevan as a sympathetic offender who 
killed a less sympathetic victim.  
Rerekura and Bevan are factually similar. Both cases involve the retrieval 
of a weapon, the dangerous use of a firearm in response to a direct challenge by 
their partner, and finally the death of their partner sparked by their non-compliant 
actions. Additionally similarities arise in the offenders’ descriptions of their own 
grief—with the insinuation that they have suffered a great loss or deprivation by 
killing the women that they loved. The language in both cases focuses on the loss 
shouldered by the offender, while failing to recognise the complete loss that the 
female partner has suffered through their death. In Rerekura McMullin J explicitly 
says that Rerekura has denied himself the company of his partner,91 whereas 
Bevan himself, in R v Bevan, discusses how he killed the woman he loved and 
deprived his children of their mother.92 
Like Bevan, R v Wawatai is a post-abolition case in which it is difficult to 
accept how the jury reached the conclusion that there was no intention to kill the 
                                                 
88 At [3]. 
89   At [38]. 
90  At [33]. 
91 R v Rerekura, above n 81, at 4. 
92 R v Bevan, above n 86, at [25]. 
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victim.93 In this case Wawatai’s partner of 30 years, Akuhata, was attempting to 
leave him by walking down the road with her bags. Wawatai found her and 
returned with her to their house. Wawatai then retrieved a container of petrol and 
splashed it through the bedroom in which Akuhata was standing. He then set the 
room on fire. Akuhata caught on fire and ran from the room into the lounge where 
she collapsed and died.  
At trial, Wawatai was convicted of arson, indicating that the jury believed 
that the prosecution had shown beyond reasonable doubt that Wawatai set fire to 
his house in circumstances where he either knew or ought to have known that he 
was likely to endanger Akuhata’s life.94 Nevertheless, Wawatai was acquitted of 
murder and instead convicted of manslaughter. Wawatai was sentenced to 13 
years for the manslaughter of Akuhata.95 
What is immediately apparent in the language used by Collins J in 
Wawatai is that he struggles to understand the manslaughter verdict returned by 
the jury.96 He states that Wawatai being found guilty of arson was difficult to 
reconcile with a manslaughter verdict.97 I agree with this assessment as it is 
incredibly challenging to see how a jury construed Wawatai’s actions as either 
unintentional or without reckless disregard for Akuhata’s life. Mallon J in Bevan 
does not discuss her thoughts on whether the verdict of the jury is difficult to 
understand, but does mention that Bevan pointed the gun at his girlfriend out of 
anger.98 Both cases have facts that suggest some form of intention or reckless 
disregard for life that the jury seems to think falls short of the standard required 
for murder. I argue that this is because simply abolishing provocation has not had 
the desired effect of removing all bias in favour of heterosexual men in homicide 
cases. Juries appear to remain attached to the norm of the dominant man who has 
been slighted by his less sympathetic partner, and the ‘appropriate use of 
                                                 
93 R v Wawatai [2014] NZHC 2374. 
94 At [3]. 
95 At [46]. 
96 At [5]. 
97 At [5]. 
98 R v Bevan, above n 86, at [33]. 
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violence’ resulting from this interaction. I remain deeply concerned at this 
continuing pattern. 
Provocation is no longer available as a partial defence, but in this part I 
have demonstrated that juries continue to recognise a lower level of culpability by 
returning a manslaughter verdict in cases where a woman has challenged a man’s 
sexuality. I suggest that the juries in cases like Bevan, Rerekura, and Wawatai 
have shifted part of the blame for the homicide back onto the victim. 
Unfortunately this indicates that the abolition of provocation was not sufficient by 
itself to remove the gender bias within homicide cases.  
B Challenges to Male Sexuality Reducing Culpability an Offender’s 
Culpability in Murder Verdicts 
Without clear instructions following the abolition of provocation—like the 
guidance that would have been provided by the Sentencing Council—there is a 
risk that the same concerns surrounding the legitimisation of violence towards 
women that occurred through provocation might remain a problem in sentencing. 
To confirm this argument, this part focuses on comparing one pre-abolition 
provocation murder case with two post-abolition murder cases. In particular, this 
part focuses on establishing the use of inappropriate mitigating factors by 
sentencing judges. I argue that these factors have the effect of legitimising 
violence and controlling conduct toward the victim when the offender is 
predisposed to jealous behaviour.  
R v Weatherston was a high profile pre-abolition murder case in which 
provocation was pled by the defence.99 In this case Clayton Weatherston and 
Sophie Elliot had been in a volatile relationship for around six months when Elliot 
broke it off in late 2007. On the day of the murder Weatherston drove to Elliot’s 
home with a number of items he was going to return to her, as well as a kitchen 
knife he bought from his home. Weatherston was let into the house and 
accompanied Elliot to her room to talk. Weatherston claimed that Elliot had 
lunged at him with scissors, and he had then snapped. Elliot’s mother heard her 
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screaming and ran to her room only to find the door locked. Elliot’s mother rang 
the police, but in the time it took them to reach the scene Weatherston had stabbed 
Elliot 216 times and mutilated her corpse.  
Weatherston raised provocation as a partial defence at trial. He claimed 
that Elliot had lunged at him with scissors, and against the difficult background of 
the relationship he was provoked.100 Weatherston also claimed that his narcissistic 
personality disorder was a special characteristic under s 169 that would have made 
the provocation more severe to him.101 The jury rejected provocation as a partial 
defence and Weatherston was convicted of murder.102 
In sentencing Weatherston, Potter J stated that a minimum non-parole 
period of 19 years would be sufficient to encapsulate the aggravating features 
present in the case.103 Potter J considered Weatherston’s prior lack of convictions, 
the support of his family, his good chance at rehabilitation, and his diminished 
understanding of the offending due to his narcissistic personality disorder as 
mitigating features to the offence.104 Therefore Potter J discounted Weatherston’s 
minimum non-parole period to 18 years.105 
The Weatherston trial received enormous public attention. In particular, 
there was outrage at Weatherston’s ability to claim that Elliot had provoked him 
into committing a truly brutal murder.106 This was compounded by his claim that 
his narcissism was a special characteristic under s 169 of the Crimes Act that 
reduced his ability to deal with her rejection.  
Narcissism was also considered as a mitigating feature following the 
abolition of provocation in R v Malik.107 Ishrat Malik was married to Farhat Malik 
                                                 
100  At [10]. 
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106  Editorial “Provocation defence has run its course” New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 
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in an unhappy marriage. The relationship had been spotted with incidents of 
domestic violence and Ms Malik left the family home with their 18-year-old 
daughter Sidra Malik. 
Malik seemed unable to handle the relationship breakdown. One night 
when Ms Malik was staying over (in a different room) he began to think about 
killing her and their daughter. In the morning he rang work, telling them he was 
sick and wouldn’t be coming in. He then took a knife and entered his estranged 
wife’s room and stabbed her 31 times while she was sleeping. He then entered his 
daughter’s room, who woke up and realised what was happening. She tried to 
escape, but Malik overpowered her and stabbed her 25 times.  
Malik pled guilty to both the murder of his wife and his daughter. Moore J 
began with a starting point of a minimum non-parole period of 21 years because 
this was both a double homicide and a brutal killing.108 However, this length was 
reduced to 18.5 years on the grounds this was Malik’s first offence, that he 
showed some remorse, and that he had been diagnosed with narcissistic 
personality disorder.109 The judge felt that being narcissistic would have 
contributed to his offending and would make prison life particularly difficult for 
him.110  
In both Weatherston and Malik narcissistic personality disorder was 
considered to be a mitigating factor in the killing of their respective ex-partners.111 
The continued acceptance of narcissism as a mitigating factor through both pre- 
and post-abolition cases is an implicit recognition of a lower level of culpability 
due to the particularly jealous nature of these men. By recognising the offenders’ 
reduced ability to cope with the victims’ behaviour, the court implicitly saddled 
the victims with some of responsibility for their own deaths. This concern was 
reflected in earlier critiques of the partial defence of provocation, and has 
unfortunately continued unchanged in law despite the abolition of provocation. 
                                                 
108  At [47] 
109  At [65]. 
110  At [58]. 
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The case R v Dawood considers a more explicit form of jealousy as a 
mitigating factor.112 Like in Malik, Najeeb Dawood’s relationship with his wife, 
Eman Hurmiz, was characterised by violent and controlling behaviour. Most of 
the violent behaviour toward his wife was borne from the irrelevant and 
unsubstantiated belief that Hurmiz was cheating on him. Dawood engaged in 
monitoring behaviours in an attempt to catch Hurmiz’s supposed cheating, so he 
installed software on his computer to record the family’s home phone 
conversations. Through this method he discovered that Hurmiz was planning to 
leave him.  
Following this discovery, Dawood convinced Hurmiz to go to a shed 
outside with him. Dawood played Hurmiz the recordings he had made of her on 
the telephone stating she wanted to leave him. He then tied one of Hurmiz’s arms 
to the chair, and stabbed her repeatedly. Hurmiz’s children heard her screaming 
and came to try help her. Dawood stabbed his daughter in the leg. Dawood then 
pushed Hurmiz down on the concrete floor and continued to stab her as she curled 
into foetal position. Dawood then called the police and tried to kill himself.  
Dawood pled guilty to the murder of his wife and wounding his daughter. 
Miller J began with a starting point of a minimum non-parole period of 19 years 
because of the planned, brutal nature of the attack, as well as the injury caused to 
Dawood’s daughter.113 The minimum non-parole period was reduced from 19 
years to 17 years after Miller J took the mitigating features of the offence into 
account.114 These included an early guilty plea, Dawood’s depression and 
abnormal jealousy. 
What was particularly interesting about Dawood was that Miller J 
expressly stated that this was not a case where the conduct of the victim was 
explicitly relevant to sentencing.115 I argue, however, that it is impossible to 
recognise Dawood’s propensity for jealousy as a mitigating feature without also 
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recognising the role his wife’s actions playing in triggering his deadly response. 
In this way Hurmiz was indirectly blamed for her own death by attempting to 
leave her ‘abnormally jealous’ husband. This shift in blame from the jealous 
offender to the female victim is representative of the concerns that previously 
existed in relation to the partial defence of provocation. The fact this transfer of 
blame is still occurring in our law under a different name is deeply concerning as 
it highlights an underlying issue about how we view women in controlling or 
violent relationships.  
The sentencing discounts in each of these three cases are indeed modest. 
However, the message behind the continued recognition of narcissism and 
abnormal jealousy as mitigating features is that, in cases where a man has a 
propensity for jealousy, a woman is partly to blame for triggering her own death if 
she in any way challenges him. Having abolished provocation in an attempt to 
remove some of the bias toward heterosexual men that existed in the partial 
defence, it is concerning that this bias still exists in the considerations of 
sentencing judges.  
In this part I have demonstrated that both judges and juries have continued 
to recognise the perceived lower culpability of men that killed their female 
partners when they were challenged. This is concerning, considering the 
substantial public dismay surrounding Weatherston and his ability to claim that 
his narcissistic personality made him less able to cope with the allegedly 
provocative actions of Elliot. This continuing protection of the concept of 
heterosexual male sexuality is exactly what the Law Commission criticised about 
the partial defence of provocation. The abolition by itself has been unable to fully 
address concerns about the dominance of male sexuality in homicide cases. An 
inclination to feel jealous or react explosively when challenged by a romantic 
partner should not impact the length of the sentence an offender will face. For this 
reason I propose that adopting the suggestion made in the Provocation Report—
that a Sentencing Council be created—is the best way to address the concerns set 
out above.   
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VII  Conclusion 
The time for provocation’s abolition had long been passed when it was 
finally repealed. As a defence it was confusing, archaic, and favoured 
heterosexual men. I argue that it legitimised violence toward women when they 
were perceived to have challenged their male partner. It allowed for the trial to 
focus upon the negative actions of the victim, while minimising the actions of the 
offender who was actually on trial. Provocation treated women as mere 
possessory objects, presenting a woman as more deserving of violence if she had 
either attempted to leave, or cheated on her partner. When provocation was finally 
abolished, there was hope that the narrative of the ‘taunted husband’ would also 
fade from our law.  
Following the abolition of provocation, Hamidzadeh and Wairau gave 
good guidance on how the conduct of the victim was relevant as a mitigating 
factor, and in determining whether it would be manifestly unjust for an offender to 
face life in prison. However, factors like narcissism and abnormal jealousy are not 
directly related to the conduct of the victim and therefore fall outside the scope of 
these cases. I have demonstrated through my case comparisons that these 
mitigating features serve the same protective function in relation to male sexuality 
that provocation did by causing the conduct of the victim to be indirectly 
scrutinised in relation to the special characteristic that the offender possessed. The 
continued recognition of mitigating factors such as narcissism and abnormal 
jealousy in murder cases where violent offenders have killed their female partners 
remains deeply concerning. These two factors are likely to only be considered 
mitigating factors in the context of a romantic relationship, and in essence provide 
an implicit acceptance of a man’s right to dominate his partner’s sexuality. This is 
clearly an inappropriate consideration that belonged to prior generations in which 
a woman was seen to be her husband’s chattel.  
Furthermore, juries and sentencing judges in manslaughter cases continue 
to inappropriately protect the construct of male sexuality when it is perceived to 
have been threatened. This is apparent in cases like Bevan or Wawatai that 
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resulted in manslaughter verdicts where it seems to be clear that there must have 
been some element of an intention to kill. In both cases manslaughter was 
arguably an inappropriate verdict considering the weapon had to be found, taken 
to the victim, and then be used in a way that was intended to threaten. I argue that 
in both cases the victim elicited less sympathy because they challenged their male 
partner, and offender was comparatively seen in a more sympathetic light. These 
results suggest that there is a more systemic gender bias in homicide cases, and 
that simply removing provocation has not fixed this issue. 
In my view, implementing the Law Commission’s recommendation to 
establish the Sentencing Council and associated sentencing guidelines would have 
provided much needed detailed guidance on how to appropriately deal with 
provocation at sentencing. I argue that had the Sentencing Council been 
established, and had they created the recommended guidelines we would see less 
of the continued problematic recognition of lower culpability in cases where a 
man’s sexuality has been challenged. This is because the sentencing guideline 
would deal with appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors, and the 
circumstances in which life in prison would be manifestly unjust in cases with 
elements of provocation.   
In the process of creating these sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing 
Council would have been required to consult with the public. During the 
Weatherston trial there was significant community concern that Weatherston was 
able to claim that Elliot’s rejection of him was more provocative because he was a 
narcissist.116 Had public consultation been undertaken in creating a draft 
guideline, I believe factors like narcissism and abnormal jealousy would have 
been excluded as possible mitigating features. Therefore, the sentencing guideline 
would have helped establish an objective benchmark for judges, helping to reduce 
unintended bias in sexual jealousy cases.  
The failure by Parliament to establish the Sentencing Council has resulted 
in a failure to recognise and take action against the public concerns emphasised in 
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Weatherston. Challenges to male sexuality still result in the recognition of the 
lower culpability of the offender by sentencing judges and juries. I remain deeply 
troubled that the gender bias in homicide sentencing remains, and that by doing 
nothing the legitimisation of violence toward women who have challenged their 
male partner or ex-partner is still occurring. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 The Implicit Legitimisation of Violence against Women in New Zealand Homicide Cases 
 
 
VIII Bibliography  
A Cases 
Hamidzadeh v R [2012] NZCA 550, [2013] 1 NZLR 369. 
R v Bevan [2012] NZHC 2969. 
R v Dawood [2013] NZHC 122. 
R v Malik [2015] NZHC 466. 
R v Rapira [2003] 3 NZLR 794, (2003) 20 CRNZ 396 (CA). 
R v Rerekura CA361/87, 21 June 1988. 
R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA). 
R v Wawatai [2014] NZHC 2374. 
R v Weatherston CRI 2008-021-137, 15 September 2009. 
Wairau v R [2015] NZCA 215. 
B Legislation 
Crimes Act 1961. 
Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Act 2009. 
Criminal Code Act 1893. 
Sentencing Act 2002. 
Sentencing Council Act 2007.  
C Articles 
32 The Implicit Legitimisation of Violence against Women in New Zealand Homicide Cases 
 
 
Christine Bond and Samantha Jefferies “Similar Punishment? Comparing 
Sentencing Outcomes in Domestic and Non-Domestic Violence Cases” (2014) 54 
British Journal of Criminology 849. 
Warren Brookbanks “Provocation and Sentencing” (2012) NZLJ 121. 
Jacquelyn Campbell and others “Intimate Partner Homicide Review and 
Implications of Research and Policy” 8(3) (2007) Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 
246. 
Charles Cato and Meredith Connell “Criminal Defences and Battered Defendants” 
(2002) NZLJ 35. 
Editorial “Provocation defence has run its course” New Zealand Herald (online 
ed, Auckland, 10 August 2009). 
Edward Gay “Partial defence of provocation set to be dumped” The New Zealand 
Herald (online ed, Auckland, 23 July 2009). 
Aya Gruber “A Provocative Defence” (2014) 103 California Law Review 273. 
“Key Approves Scrapping Provocation” Otago Daily Times (online ed, Dunedin, 
23 July 2009). 
Elisabeth McDonald “Feminist legal theory in Aotearoa New Zealand: The impact 
of international critical work on local criminal law reform" (2014) 28(2) Women's 
Studies Journal 68. 
Elisabeth McDonald “Provocation, Sexuality and the Actions of ‘Thoroughly 
Decent men’” (1993) 9(2) Women's Studies Journal 125. 
Jenny Morgan “Homicide law reform and gender: Configuring Violence” (2012) 
45(3) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 351. 
Jenny Morgan, “Critique and Comment: Provocation Law and Facts: Dead 
Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them” (1997) 21 MULR 237. 
33 The Implicit Legitimisation of Violence against Women in New Zealand Homicide Cases 
 
 
Julia Tolmie “Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence? Recent Proposals to 
Abolish Provocation” (2005) NZ Law Review 25. 
“The Partial Defence of Provocation” (2007) NZLJ 378. 
D Reports 
Family Violence Death Review Committee Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 
to December 2013 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, June 2014). 
Family Violence Death Review Committee Third Annual Report: December 2011 
to December 2012 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, June 2013). 
Jennifer Martin and Rhonda Pritchard Learning from Tragedy: Homicide within 
Families in New Zealand 2002 – 2006 (Ministry of Social Development, April 
2010). 
New Zealand Law Commission Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform, 
(NZLC R94, Wellington, 2006). 
New Zealand Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular 
Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, Wellington, 2001). 
New Zealand Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, 
Wellington, 2007). 
New Zealand Law Commission Victims of Family Violence that Commit 
Homicide (forthcoming). 
E Texts and Chapters in Texts 
Kate Fitz-Gibbon “Homicide Law Reform, Gender and the Provocation Defence a 
Comparative Perspective” in (Palgrave Macmillan, England, 2014). 
Elisabeth McDonald “Provoking Law Reform Feminism, Queer Theory and the 
Legislative Agenda" in Claire Charters and Dean R Knight (eds) We, The 
34 The Implicit Legitimisation of Violence against Women in New Zealand Homicide Cases 
 
 
People(s): Participation in Governance (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 
2011) 237. 
F Theses 
Annie O’Connor “Sentencing the Killers of Gay Men since the Abolition of 
Provocation in New Zealand: Have the Courts Reflected Community Concerns?” 
(LLB (Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013). 
Matthew Gale “Provoked to Action: the Implications of Repealing the 
Provocation Defence to Murder” (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, University of Otago, 
2010). 
 
Word Count: The text of this paper comprises 7994 words. This includes the title 
and main text. This excludes the cover page, abstract, key words, table of 
contents, bibliographic footnotes, and bibliography. 
 
